Tilting the Playing Field (Why a sports league planner would choose less, not more, competitive balance): The case of English Football by Stefan Szymanski & Stephanie Leach
1Stefan Szymanski, Tanaka Business School, Imperial College London, South
Kensington campus, SW7 2AZ, UK. Tel : (44) 20 7594 9107, Fax: (44) 20 7823 7685, e-mail:
szy@imperial.ac.uk.
2Stephanie Leach, Tanaka Business School, Imperial College London, South Kensington
campus, SW7 2AZ, UK. Tel : (44) 20 7594 9171, Fax: (44) 20 7823 7685, e-mail:
stephanie.leach@imperial.ac.uk
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 06-19
Tilting the Playing Field (Why a sports league planner would choose
less, not more, competitive balance): The case of English Football
Stefan Szymanski




It has traditionally been argued that the organizer of a sports league would prefer more
competitive balance to the level that emerges in a noncooperative equilibrium. This argument
has been used to justify restraints on competition between teams, which also tend to raise profits
at the expense of players and consumers. This paper shows that in theory a planner would prefer
less, not more, competitive balance. The paper uses data from the second tier of professional
English league football to show just how unbalanced a league planner would choose.
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper concerns a simple proposition. It is widely held that (a) a degree of 
competitive balance between teams is required to make an attractive sporting contest 
and that (b) in the absence of competitive restraints the outcome of a league 
competition will become too unbalanced. This paper argues, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, that the degree of competitive balance that obtains at the Nash 
equilibrium in a competitive sports league will be greater than that which would be 
chosen by a league planner seeking to maximise league attendance. In other words, 
competition produces too much rather than too little competitive balance. 
 
We demonstrate this proposition both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, the 
explanation is simple. In a sports league the teams compete to be successful, and 
successful teams attract more fans and more revenue. Typically, however, the 
marginal return on success differs between teams (usually, though not always, this is 
because the marginal revenue from success is greater for big city teams than for small 
city teams). League competition is a zero sum game: the supply of success is fixed. 
As in any competitive situation, competitors impose externalities on each other, since 
they fail to take into account the losses imposed on their rivals by their own success. 
Teams with a low marginal return to success create a larger externality than teams 
with a high marginal return to success. At a competitive equilibrium all teams over-
invest relative to the level of investment that would be chosen by an attendance 
maximising league planner, but the teams with a low marginal return on success over-
invest more than the teams with a higher marginal return. At equilibrium, a marginal 
reduction in investment by teams with a low marginal return will increase total 
support (or revenues) for the league as a whole.  
 
Empirically, we estimate the relationship between success and attendance in the 
second tier of English football
3. During the period we study, 1978 to 2003, estimating 
the relationship between wins and attendance in the first tier is problematic because of 
capacity constraints. In the second tier there were almost no capacity constraints, and 
                                                 
3 Between 1892 and 1992 this was called the Second Division of the Football League; from 1992 until 
2004, following the breakaway of the old First Division to form the FA Premier League, it was known 
as the First Division of the Football League; in 2004 it was renamed the Football League 
Championship. To avoid confusion we will refer to it simply as the second tier.   2
hence estimating the relationship between success and attendance is relatively 
straightforward. We measure success by the percentage of matches won during a 
season, treating a draw as a half a win. We find, unsurprisingly, that the sensitivity of 
attendance to wins varies substantially between teams. Using the estimated 
sensitivities we are able to simulate the attendance maximising distribution of wins, 
and we show that this distribution is far more uneven than the empirical distribution 
of wins. 
 
The paper is set out as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss the conventional 
wisdom on the relationship between competitive balance and attendance. In section 3 
we discuss the theoretical result and its relation to the literature on competitive 
balance and in section 4 we discuss both the empirical methodology and the results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
  
2. The relationship between the distribution of results and the attractiveness of a 
sports league 
 
It is widely agreed that a degree of “outcome uncertainty” is necessary to maintain 
interest in a sporting competition. The proposition was stated succinctly in one of the 
first mathematical treatments of a sports league: 
 
“As the probability of either team winning approaches one, gate receipts fall 
substantially, consequently, every team has an economic motive for not becoming too 
superior” El-Hodiri and Quirk, 1971, p1306.  
 
Or in the words of Walter Neale, the prayer of every team must be “Oh Lord, make us 
good, but not that good” (Neale, 1964, p21). It has been the repeated claim of sports 
leagues across the world that unrestrained competition between teams will result in a 
situation where the stronger teams become “too good” and the weaker teams “not 
good enough”, and that this will lead to a loss of interest in the sport. This argument 
has been used to justify the adoption of competitive restraints. Most notably, Major 
League Baseball in the USA repeatedly justified its reserve clause, a system 
introduced in 1879 which effectively tied a player to his club in perpetuity, on the   3
grounds that it was necessary to maintain competitive balance. As early as 1889 the 
League issued a statement claiming that the Reserve Clause was instituted to protect 




The need to maintain competitive balance was also cited in the notorious Federal 
Baseball case which handed organized baseball an antitrust exemption.
5 According to 
the submission of the owners, “If the reserve clause did not exist, the highly skillful 
players would be absorbed by the more wealthy clubs, and thus some clubs in the 
league would so far outstrip others in playing ability that the contests between the 
superior and inferior clubs would be uninteresting, and the public would refuse to 
patronize them.” (Court of Appeals, 1920). 
 
A similar restraint, called the “retain and transfer system” was adopted by the English 
Football League, in 1889, one year after its foundation. The rule was justified in 1906 
thus by one former player: “I think it will be admitted that it is not for the good of 
football that the cream of players shall be in half a dozen teams. No matter how strong 
a club may be, it cannot play matches with itself. It must have opponents, and it is 
well that it should have plenty of able opponents… Without the restriction which the 
transfer system imposed no poor club could have held its players long”.
6  
 
The system lasted until 1963 when it was struck down by Justice Wilberforce, largely 
on the grounds that, while maintaining a balance might be a legitimate goal of the 
League, the system in fact failed to do so: “Under the existing system the richer clubs- 
which are to be found in the larger centres of population- already tend to secure the 
better players; this is simply because, both from bigger gate-money and from the 
                                                 
4“As a check on competition, the weaker clubs demanded the privilege of reserving five players…”, 
The statement was issued in connection with a dispute over the control of player contracts with the 
rival Players’ League created in the same year. The statement went on to say “the necessity for such 
power of preserving the circuit of a league, by approximately equalizing its playing strength, is 
recognized by the League”. Spalding (1911). The early development of what might be called the 
“competitive balance defense” is discussed in Eckard (2001). He points out that the competitive 
balance defense started to be used only in the late 1880s by which time it had become apparent that 
Congress would pass an antitrust law; prior to that the reserve clause was justified simply in terms of 
reducing player wages. 
5 While much weakened, the exemption remains in place to the present day. 
6 William Bassett, “Big Transfers and the Transfer System” in The Book of Football, p161, republished 
1997, Desert Island Books.   4
contributions of local supporters of affluence, the clubs in the larger centres inevitably 
enjoy greater resources, and because the best, if not the only way to use these  
resources is to buy players with them. It is not established to my satisfaction that any 
substantial change would be brought about if the retention system were abolished”.
7 
 
In 1995 The European Court of Justice struck down the transfer system for football 
players then operating within the European Union since it was ruled incompatible 
with Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome (which guarantees free movement of labour). 
The Opinion of Judge Advocate Lenz in this case stated “it should be noted that I 
share the opinion…that a professional league can flourish only if there is no too 
glaring imbalance between the clubs taking part. If the league is clearly dominated by 
one team the necessary tension is absent and the interest of the spectators will thus 
probably lapse within a foreseeable period…However, I am of the opinion that the 
transfer rules in their current form cannot be justified by that consideration”.
8 
 
No one, however, advocates perfect balance. It is widely accepted that big city teams 
will tend to be stronger than small city teams, and that a degree of imbalance is not 
unhealthy. From the standpoint of economic theory the central question that this 
discussion raises is this: granted a competition may become less attractive if it 
becomes too unbalanced, is it then the case that the distribution of outcomes at a 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium will be less balanced than the distribution which 





The most consistently voiced opinion in the sports economics literature is that the 
planner’s equilibrium will coincide with the noncooperative equilibrium- this is the 
so-called Invariance Principle. This was first articulated by Quirk and El-Hodiri 
(1974) in relation to the sharing of gate revenues. They claimed that in a league “with 
franchise owners motivated solely by profit…the distribution of playing strengths is 
independent of the gate-sharing arrangements” and “is the same as it would be if the 
                                                 
7 Quoted in Dabscheck (1985), p9. 
8 Quoted in Gardiner et al. (1998), pp365-7.   5
league were operated as a syndicate with central control over the allocation of players 
among teams” (pp36-7). This implies that noncooperative profit maximization by 
competing firms in a sports league generates the same distribution of resources as a 
central planner (or joint profit maximization). This position was restated by, inter alia, 
Fort and Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (1995).  
 
Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) prove that, contrary to the claims of Quirk and El-
Hodiri, increased gate revenue sharing will in fact lead to a reduction in competitive 
balance. The reason for this is the same as the rationale advanced in this paper. As 
gate sharing increases teams get closer to adopting the planner’s solution, and the 
planner’s solution entails less competitive balance than the noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium. In a noncooperative model, teams impose externalities on each other 
through their choices. Both teams over-invest, but relatively speaking it is the weaker 
drawing teams that over-invest most
9; revenue sharing eliminates the externality, and 
this therefore produces a more uneven talent distribution. Full revenue sharing is 
equivalent to joint profit maximization, so it follows that a league planner will choose 
a less balanced distribution of results than at the noncooperative equilibrium. 
 
This point is easily illustrated using a simple model. The structure of the model is 
close to that of the earlier sports literature, e.g. Atkinson et al (1988), and Fort and 
Quirk (1995). We make the following assumptions: 
 
A1. Attendance generation: Each team generates attendance according to the number 
of wins, represented by a concave function Qi(wi) with Qi’ > 0 and Qi’’ ≤ 0; beyond 
some critical value it is possible that Qi’ < 0. 
 
We here follow the US literature in modeling win percentage rather than league 




                                                 
9 it is worth noting that, in practice, weaker teams tend to be the ones that find themselves in financial 
difficulties 
10 The league system in England awarded two points for a win and one point for a draw until 1982, 
giving an identical weighting as our win percentage. Since 1982 three points have been awarded for a 
win. The correlation between win percentage and league rank in our sample, which is the second tier 
between 1978 and 2003, is 0.94.   6
A2. Win production: Each team purchases talent (t) in a competitive market. Talent is 
assumed to be measured in perfectly divisible units and sold at a constant marginal 
cost. Increasing investment in talent increases the probability of winning and therefore 
expected win percentage. The win production function is strictly concave, 


















We assume a conventional league where every team plays every other team twice, 
home and away. Since each team can win between 0 and 100% of its games, and 
aggregate winning percentage for the league is n/2, where n is the number of teams.
11 
It is standard in the US literature to assume that there is a fixed pool of talent, but in 
the case of second tier English football, it is more sensible to assume a perfectly 
elastic supply of talent, since teams can easily trade in either the domestic or the 
international market. This assumption affects only the price of talent in the market. 
 
A3. Teams maximize profits, and the league planner maximizes attendance. To 
compare the planner’s choice with the teams’ choices in a competitive market we 
assume that ticket prices are identical, implying that profit maximization and 






                                                 
11 In this paper win percentage for a team refers to its performance over the entire season against all 
teams, rather than the sum of bilateral win percentages from which the season’s win percentage must 










, where Mi is the total number of games played by a team in the 
season, mij is the number of games played between teams i and j in a season and wij is the percentage of 
these games won by team i. As long as every team plays the same number of games then the sum of 
win percentages must add to n/2. There is an interesting scheduling problem when, as in MLB, each 
team is not required to play every other team or to play an equal number of games against every other 
team. The scheduler can arrange any number of match-ups between any pair of teams except for 3, 
whose schedule must be determined in order to meet the constraint that each team plays the same 
number of games.  
12 This assumption essentially rules out any conflict between a league planner and a social planner’s 
objective, assuming that a social planner was indifferent as to the identity of successful and 
unsuccessful teams. When we allow prices to vary, it is possible that a social planner interested in 
maximising attendance might prefer a different distribution of wins to the league planner.   7
(a) If the marginal revenue functions are identical, then the noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium for the league will be perfectly balanced. In this case the planner’s 
equilibrium coincides with the Nash equilibrium. 
  
(b) With asymmetric marginal revenue functions, the planner’s equilibrium is less 
balanced than the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, in the sense that the difference in 
win percentage between any pair of teams will be larger at the planner’s equilibrium. 
The only possible exception is when there exist two teams, one of which has a win 
percentage of 0 and the other a win percentage of 1 at the planner’s equilibrium, in 
which case the planner’s allocation of wins to these two teams will be identical to the 
Nash equilibrium. Note that if such a pair exists, it is unique. 
 
Proof 
Part (a) is obvious and well known in the literature (e.g. El-Hodiri and Quirk, 1971, 
proposition 3, p1312).  
 
To prove part (b), first note that the profit function of team i is:  
 
(1)   i i i i i ct w Q p − = ) ( π  
 
where p is the price of a ticket and c is the marginal cost per unit of talent. We 
compare two cases, one where each team maximizes profit independently, and the 
other where a league planner maximizes joint profits. Suppose that both the 
competitive and planner’s equilibrium involves an interior solution. Given the 
technology of winning, the noncooperative Nash equilibrium is characterized by the 






















 for all i and j. 
                                                 
13 Strictly speaking, if the supply of talent is fixed, teams should not choose talent but a budget which 
then determines the share of talent of each team. However, if we assume that the allocation of talent as 
a function of budgets is the same as the allocation of wins as a function of talent, then the budget and 
talent choice problems are identical.   8
 




At the Nash equilibrium defined by (2), if t i > tj then Q’i > Q’j. Thus at equilibrium 
the marginal revenue of a win for a dominant team is greater than the marginal 
revenue of a win for a weak team. For the league planner, however, the equilibrium 
condition is simply 
 







  for all i and j 
 
To meet the planner’s objective (4) requires that the marginal revenue of team i to fall 
relative to the equilibrium described in (3), and the marginal revenue of team j to rise. 
Given concavity, this can only happen if wins increase for team i and fall for team j, 
implying increased dominance of team i at the planner’s equilibrium. 
 
Suppose, alternatively, that the Nash equilibrium involves a corner solution. 
Comparing any two teams in the league, there are three possibilities (i) one has a win 
percentage of 1 and the other zero, (ii) one has a win percentage of 0 and other has a 
win percentage between 0 and 1, and (iii) one has a win percentage of 1 and other has 
a win percentage between 0 and 1. Note that at most one team in a league can have a 
win percentage of 0 and one team a win percentage of 1.
 15 In each case the planner 
wants to move the marginal revenues of the teams toward equality, and therefore both 
increase the wins of the stronger team and reduce the wins of the weaker team. In 
case (i) no change is possible, and so the balance between these two teams is 
unchanged. In cases (ii) and (iii), however, it is possible to increase win percentage of 
the strong team and reduce the win percentage of the weak team respectively, and 
hence it is possible for the imbalance between these two teams to increase. QED 
                                                 
14 An additional condition, ignored here, is that marginal revenues must equal the marginal cost of 
talent. When supply is fixed the price of talent must be bid up to satisfy this condition. If marginal cost 
is not bid up to meet the equilibrium condition there will be pressure either to expand the league or for 
a new league to enter the market. 
15 In practice no team in the second tier of English football has ever had a perfect winning or losing 
record.   9
 
Given the modesty of the assumptions made the result is rather striking. One of the 
most important advantages associated with research in sports economics is the 




4. Empirical evidence 
 
There is a large literature on the demand for team sports in general and for English 
soccer in particular, and much of it involves an attempt to test for the uncertainty of 
outcome hypothesis. There are a number of recent surveys of this literature, including 
Dobson and Goddard (2001), Szymanski (2003) and Borland and McDonald (2004).  
 
The most widely used technique is to examine attendance at individual matches where 
the difference in the quality of the teams can be measured and to ask whether smaller 
gaps in team quality make for larger attendance. Despite the universal approval that 
the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis commands, the empirical support is 
surprisingly weak. For example, McDonald and Borland reviewed 18 studies of match 
uncertainty and concluded “only about three provide strong evidence of an effect on 
attendance…Other studies provide mixed evidence that suggests a negative effect on 
attendance of increasing home-team win probability only when the win probability is 
above two thirds. The majority of studies find that there is either no significant 
relationship between difference in team performance and attendance…, or more 
directly contradictory, that attendance is monotonically increasing in the probability 
of a home team win” (p486). In fact, this should not be all that surprising. Most of the 
fans at games support the home team, and most of these fans just want their team to 
win. Even excessive dominance does not seem to dent their enthusiasm (anecdotally, 
Arsenal did not lose a single game in the 2003/04 season with a win percentage of 
84%, and every match was a sell-out).  
 
In this paper we focus on seasonal average attendance and the competitive balance of 
an entire championship. Fewer studies have focused on this issue, although arguably 
the balance of an entire championship is more important for thinking about   10
competitive balance and competitive restraints imposed by leagues than the balance of 
an individual match. The first issue is to decide how to measure competitive balance. 
The within-season standard deviation of team win percentages is the most popular 
measure used in the literature. This is a convenient summary statistic for the degree of 
balance of league taken as a whole, and facilitates between season comparisons.
16 A 
variety of other metrics have been used- e.g. the Gini coefficient (Schmidt and Berri 
(2001)), The Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Depken (1999)), entropy (Horowitz 
(1997), the average number of games behind the winner (Knowles et al (1992)). No 
doubt there are many others that could be constructed.  
 
In this study we concentrate on the second tier of English football. Since 1921 there 
have been four principal professional football leagues in England. Until 1992 these 
were all controlled by the Football League, when the top tier, now known as the FA 
Premier League seceded to form their own organization.
17 Unlike closed American 
leagues, where each league has a fixed number of teams (apart from the occasional 
addition of “expansion franchises”), English football uses the promotion and 
relegation system, whereby there are a fixed number of places in each league, but 
teams move up and down between leagues (or league divisions as they are 
traditionally known in England) based on performance.
18 Throughout most of the 
period covered by our data the three worst performing teams each season, based on 
points,
19 were relegated to the third tier, the two best performing teams were 
automatically promoted to the top tier, while the four next best performing teams 
contested play-offs for an additional promotion slot.  
 
We chose not to look at the top tier largely because of the difficulties induced by 
capacity constraints. Over the last fifteen years the top tier has enjoyed rapid growth 
in attendance, averaging 4% per year between the nadir in 1988/89 and 2002/03. In 
                                                 
16 Where the number of games played in the season varies, this can be normalized against the 
“idealized” standard deviation, which is expected standard deviation over M games when each team’s 
expected winning percentage is 0.5 (see e.g. Fort and Quirk (1995)). 
17 See footnote 3 on nomenclature. 
18 There has been some recent academic interest in comparing the US closed system and the promotion 
and relegation system which is used in football worldwide. For an American perspective on how the 
system operates in England see Noll (2002), for an antitrust analysis see Ross and Szymanski (2002), 
and for an analysis of the economic incentives see Szymanski and Valletti (2003). 
19 Since 1982 three points have been awarded for a win and one for a draw- prior to this only two 
points were awarded for a win.   11
the mid 1990s an increasing fraction of games were sell outs and by the end of the 
1990s almost every single Premier League game was a sell-out. We looked at average 
attendance data for top tier clubs between 1977 and 2003, and found that over the 
period there were 117 cases out of a sample of 549 (21%) where teams were capacity 
constrained (defined by annual attendance exceeding 90% of stated capacity), and all 
but five of these cases arose in the last ten years. We considered using a Tobit 
specification, but there are well known difficulties concerning normality and 
heteroscedasticity (see e.g. Greene (2000)). An alternative strategy would be to 
restrict our sample to the pre-1995 period, but we preferred to concentrate on the 
second tier, where capacity constraints are almost unknown.
20 
 










































































Attendance standard deviation of winning percentage  
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1 illustrates total annual attendance and the within season standard deviation of 
win percentages in the second tier over the sample period.
21 Attendance has varied 
quite substantially, from a low of around 4 million in 1985/86 to a high of over 8 
million in 2002/03. The within season standard deviation of win percentage has varied 
between 0.072 and 0.131. There is quite a small degree of variation relative to the 
                                                 
20 In fact, we did examine this restricted sample and found results similar to those presented below. The 
regressions are available from the authors on request.  
21 The attendance data was downloaded from http://www.european-football-statistics.co.uk/ and the 
league tables were downloaded from http://www.rsssf.com/.   12
potential variation- the theoretical minimum being 0 (when each team win 50% of its 
games) and the maximum 0.307 (given a league of 24 teams where each plays home 
and away against every other team, one team could win 46 games, another 44, another 
42, and so on). Thus the actual difference between the highest and lowest standard 
deviation is only about 20% of the maximum possible variation. The data suggests 
little relationship between competitive balance as measured by the standard deviation 
of win percentage and attendance, which are in fact positively correlated (correlation 
coefficient 0.22), meaning that higher annual attendance is associated with less, not 
more, competitive balance. 
 
This may help to explain why, despite the fact that there are a number of studies that 
examine seasonal attendance at English league clubs, none of them have reported a 
measure of competitive balance as an explanatory variable. Recent studies include 
Dobson and Goddard (1995), Simmons (1996) and Szymanski and Smith (1997), who 
consider mainly long term trends and the influence of factors such as prices. All 
include league position as an explanatory variable which is, not surprisingly, highly 
significant. Dobson and Goddard (1995, 2001) go further and include a club specific 
league position variable, and show that there is a large variation between clubs in the 
sensitivity of attendance to league position. The reported short term sensitivities from 
Dobson and Goddard (2001) are highly correlated with average league position over 
their sample period, which is in turn highly correlated with their estimate of a team’s 
“base attendance”, or what might be called the drawing potential of the club.
22 In 
other words, some teams tend to have greater drawing power than others, these teams 
tend to be more successful, and also have a greater short-run sensitivity of attendance 
to demand. 
 
These results support our contention that less balanced distribution of results will 
increase attendance, since the model implies that the maximum attendance is achieved 
by giving the highest possible win percentage to the team with the largest sensitivity 
of attendance to wins, the second largest win percentage to the team with the second 
highest sensitivity of attendance to wins, and so on. Such a distribution of wins would 
                                                 
22 The estimates are reported in Dobson and Goddard (2001), pp348-351, column 2 (average league 
position), column 3, “base attendance”, and column 4, short run sensitivity of attendance to demand. 
The correlation coefficient for columns 2 and 4 is -0.48 (higher league positions have lower numbers).   13
produce the maximum feasible standard deviation of 0.307 for the second tier, and 
hence a much more uneven distribution of success than has been observed in practice. 
However, their linear specification implies constant returns to success, whereas it is 
plausible to suppose that decreasing returns will set in if a team becomes extremely 
successful, possibly even leading to a decline in attendance if success is too 
predictable. 
 
While no studies of seasonal attendance in English football has examined the effect of 
competitive balance, two studies of Major League Baseball have done so. Schmidt 
and Berri (2001) relate attendance over the past 100 years in the National League and 
American League to a Gini coefficient based on wins. They find over this period that 
demand increases significantly with increasing balance. However, when they estimate 
a panel regression over a shorter, more recent, period, in order to include other 
economic variables of interest such as price, they find that the Gini coefficient has the 
opposite effect- reducing competitive balance increases attendance.
23 This result 
flagrantly contradicts the conventional wisdom. Schmidt and Berri restrict the 
coefficient on win percentage to be common across all teams, a restriction which 
seems unlikely to be supported by the data.  Humphreys (2002), proposes a measure 
of competitive balance which combines both the within-season standard deviation of 
win percentages and the between-season variation, capturing the idea that dominance 
between seasons is also likely to affect attendance. He also examines aggregate 
attendance over a 100-year period, pooling National League and American League 
data, and finds that attendance is significantly affected by his measure, even when 
conventional measures of within competitive balance are insignificant. Both these 
studies suggest that competitive balance affects attendance in aggregate, but they give 
little indication as to how the distribution of wins between individual teams will affect 
attendance. Indeed, these studies imply that winning impacts each team in the same 
way.  
 
Our empirical strategy builds on our observation about the club specific sensitivities 
estimated by Dobson and Goddard. We estimate a linear relationship between 
attendance and win percentage for each team that appeared in the second tier between 
                                                 
23 This is no longer true when they average over a three to five year period.   14
1977 and 2003, but we also allow for a quadratic term, on the commonly stated 
assumption that excessive dominance may reduce attendance.  
 
Thanks to the promotion and relegation system, there were 70 teams that appeared in 
the second tier of English football over the 26 seasons. Between 1977 and 1987 there 
were 22 teams, in following season the number was increased to 23, and in the 
following year raised again to 24, since when the number has been unchanged. We 
thus have 603 observations in the population, but six cases, involving teams that 
appeared for only a single season in the sample period, were deleted. The most 
frequent participant was Barnsley, which appeared a total of twenty times, and the 
median number of appearances for a club was 8.  
 
Our estimating equation is: 
 
(4) Attendanceit = at + bi wpcit + ci wpcit
2 + εit  
 
Which we estimate using ordinary least squares. While this is a very simple model, 
the adjusted R
2 of 0.838 suggests that it fits the data extremely well. The linear terms 
are all positive and significant at the 5% level or better. When we estimated the 
quadratic term for each team we found that this produced twelve cases with positive 
coefficients, implying increasing returns to wins but these were statistically 
insignificant. Indeed, only ten of the squared terms were significant at the 5% level 
and so we grouped all the insignificant terms together and estimated a single squared 
term for each (while retaining a separate linear term for each). We tested the 
restriction of equality of the quadratic coefficients and could not reject the 
restriction.
24 The regression output is reported in appendix 1. The yearly fixed effects 
closely capture the trend in total attendance: the correlation coefficient between total 
attendance and the year dummies is 0.94.
25  
                                                 
24 The test statistic for the restriction is distributed χ
2(53) and the value of the test statistic is 50.914, 
which has p-value of 0.556. 
25 Earlier studies have expressed concern about stationarity of the data. Clearly win percentage, which 
must always average 0.5, has no trend, but attendance in most leagues that have been studied shows a 
strong trend, usually upwards. Our data is trending down between 1977 and 1986 and upwards since 
then, as can be seen from figure 1. An obvious solution is to difference the data, but this sacrifices a 
large number of degrees of freedom (we lose over 100 observations, largely because promotion and 
relegation means that teams seldom experience a lengthy continuous spell in the division), and the   15
 
From our quadratic estimates we are able to calculate the attendance maximising 
distribution of win percentage. Given b > 0 and c < 0 for all i, the league planner will 
maximize total attendance when the marginal attendance for each team with respect to 
wins is equalized; in other words 
 




(6) wpci = (b j - b i )/2ci + (c j/c i) wpcj  
 
If we sum over all wpci not including wpcj, then 
 
(7)   ∑(i≠j) wpci = ∑(i≠j) [(bj - bi)/ 2ci] + cj wpcj ∑(i≠j) (1/ci) 
 
but also  
 
(8)  ∑(i≠j) wpci = n/2 - wpcj. 
 
This is the adding up constraint which requires that the sum of individual team win 
percentages equals n/2 where n is the number of teams in the league. Hence 
 
(9)   wpcj = {n/2 - ∑(i≠j) [ (bj - bi)/2ci]}/[1 + cj ∑(i≠j)(1/ci)] 
 
Note that (9) does not impose the constraint that win percentage lies between 0 and 1 
for each team. However, when we calculated the optimal win percentage for teams 
over the last decade, we found that only 28 out of 240 cases lay outside the feasible 
range. Clearly it makes no sense to argue that attendance could be increased if teams 
could achieve the impossible, so we restricted the win percentages outside the feasible 
                                                                                                                                            
estimates are then poorly defined. Nonetheless, even in differenced form there remains a significant 
positive correlation between win percentage and attendance in aggregate.   16
range to be either 0 (if negative) or 1 (if positive).
26 As an example, Table 1 shows the 
actual and simulated results for the 2002/03 season.  In this case the win percentage of 
Sheffield Wednesday is constrained to equal 1, the win percentage of Wimbledon to 
be zero and the win percentage of Gillingham to be 4.3% (since two teams cannot 
have a zero win percentage).
27 
 
The results illustrate our fundamental proposition. The actual standard deviation of 
win percentages in the season was 0.106 and the total of average attendances per team 
was 370,240.
28 The distribution of results under the optimal unconstrained allocation 
produces a standard deviation of win percentage of 0.34, beyond the theoretical 
maximum (because the unconstrained optimum includes win percentages in the 
unfeasible range). Once the extreme win percentages are constrained to fall within the 
bounds of possibility, their standard deviation is 0.277, still close to the theoretical 
maximum of 0.307, and far in excess of the actual figure for that season. This 
distribution of win percentages would have produced a total average attendance per 
team of 408,052 which is 10.2% larger than the actual attendance figure. Thus, as 
expected, a more uneven distribution of wins produces an increase in attendance.
29   
 
                                                 
26 Note that if two teams had an unconstrained win percentage greater than one then only one of them 
could have a win percentage of one, and the other could have at most a win percentage of 0.957. For 
the decade 1994-2003 there were nine cases where only one team had an unconstrained win percentage 
greater than one and one case where two teams had an unconstrained win percentage greater than one. 
27 Although the constrained model described here ensures that impossible win percentages for an 
individual team are eliminated, it does not ensure that win percentages sum to n/2. In 5 out of our ten 
simulations the constrained sum of win percentages are less than n/2, and hence the optimum 
attendance would be even larger, in one year all the optimal win percentages lay in the feasible range 
(0,1), while in four years the sum exceeded n/2, but at most by one percent of n/2, implying a 
negligible overstatement for the optimal attendance. 
28 Total attendance for the season was therefore 24 times this figure. 
29 It is perhaps obvious that this greater inequality of results would also produce a larger standard 




Table 1: Actual and maximum attendance for the second tier, 2002/03 
 

















Bradford City  0.413 12501 0.650 0.650 18944 
Brighton & Hove Albion  0.370 6651 0.781 0.781  23305 
Burnley  0.435 13977 0.597 0.597 17276 
Coventry City  0.413 14813 0.733 0.733 21695 
Crystal Palace  0.489 16867 0.749 0.749 22234 
Derby County  0.402 25470 0.393 0.393 18524 
Gillingham  0.500 8078 -0.104  0.043 2761 
Grimsby Town  0.326 5700 0.143 0.143 5049 
Ipswich Town  0.554 25455 0.360 0.360 19298 
Leicester City  0.717 29231 0.893 0.893 27293 
Millwall  0.511 8512 0.263 0.263 7927 
Norwich City  0.543 20353 0.843 0.843 25490 
Nottingham Forest  0.587 24437 0.495 0.495 21477 
Portsmouth  0.750 18906 0.660 0.660 19280 
Preston North End  0.489 13853 0.379 0.379 10942 
Reading  0.587 16011 0.426 0.426 12247 
Rotherham United  0.478 7522 0.167 0.167 5607 
Sheffield United  0.620 18073 0.403 0.403 16401 
Sheffield Wednesday  0.391 20327 1.362 1.000 37883 
Stoke City  0.413 14588 0.767 0.767 22843 
Walsall  0.424 6978 0.182 0.182  11136 
Watford  0.467 13405 0.528 0.528 15173 
Wimbledon  0.511 2787 -0.205  0.000 1983 
Wolverhampton Wanderers  0.609 25745 0.535 0.535 23285 
       
Total  12 370240 12 11.991  408052 
Standard deviation  0.106 7327 0.340 0.277 8583 
 
 
Table 2 summarises the results for the previous decade. It shows both the actual and 
maximum feasible attendance each season, assuming an attendance maximising 
distribution of win percentage, and associated standard deviations of win percentages. 
The table shows that total attendance could have been increased in every season, by 
amounts varying between 3.6% and 9.9%, if the standard deviation of win 
percentages had been much larger than that observed. In other words, a less balanced 
competition could have produced greater attendance. 
 
   1
 
Table 2 : Actual attendance and maximum feasible attendance, 1994-2003 
 
Season  Sum of average 
attendance per 
club (actual) 










deviation of win 
percentages 
(constrained) 
sum of win 
percentages 
(constrained) 
1993/94 281938  296615  5.2%  0.086  0.274  11.571 
1994/95 261222  270633  3.6%  0.081  0.238  11.503 
1995/96 284512  296466  4.2%  0.072  0.266  11.543 
1996/97 300336  314789  4.8%  0.094  0.231  12.000 
1997/98 362128  397913  9.9%  0.115  0.289  12.115 
1998/99 327961  354169  8.0%  0.116  0.287  12.060 
1999/00 339712  368816  8.6%  0.111  0.256  12.087 
2000/01 344097  376491  9.4%  0.115  0.283  12.124 
2001/02 366164  402470  9.9%  0.112  0.306  11.906 
2002/03 370240  408052  10.2%  0.106  0.277  11.991 
  
 
One constraint that we have not addressed in our analysis is the capacity of the 
stadium. In the last decade there are 28 cases (just over 1 per season) where the 
optimal win percentage implied an attendance that exceeded the capacity of the 
stadium, with the median shortfall being 14%. If we assumed that each stadium could 
only accommodate its stated capacity, the optimal attendance would fall somewhat, 
but not by much, given that nearly 90% of teams would have had spare capacity under 
an optimal distribution of wins. It also seems reasonable to argue that if it were 
possible to engineer an optimal distribution of wins, it would also be feasible to 





This paper makes a startling proposition: the distribution of success in a sports league 
produced at the noncooperative equilibrium is more balanced than the planner’s (or 
the joint profit maximising) equilibrium, assuming that the planner wants to maximise 
league attendance. This contradicts the conventional wisdom that competition 
produces too little competitive balance and that governing bodies should take 
measures to increase competitive balance for the sake of preserving interest in the 
game.  
   2
However, it is the conventional wisdom that flies in the face of economic theory. 
Even if the result that a planner would choose less, not more, competitive balance 
seems counterintuitive, it is in fact just one example of a standard result in the 
economic literature. Consider for example, a Cournot quantity setting game in which 
firms have asymmetric (constant) marginal costs. At an interior equilibrium the high 
marginal cost firms depress industry profits not only because of the pure competition 
effect, but also because the industry could profitably replace any unit of output from 
one of these firms with a unit of output from a low marginal cost firm. A planner 
would shut down all the high marginal cost firms. A similar story can be found in 
auction theory. In a first or second price auction with private values, a low valuation 
bidder will impose an externality on the high valuation bidder (who wins the auction), 
by forcing them to increase their bid. In general, the elimination of the low valuation 




Our results have significant implications for public policy in relation to sports 
leagues. Antitrust authorities have traditionally looked kindly upon restrictions which 
league authorities claim will improve competitive balance, even if these restrictions 
have, at the same time, negative implications for player wages, ticket prices, or access 
of consumers to football on TV. This paper, however, suggests that the competitive 
balance justification is perverse, given that attendances should be expected to fall if 
the league becomes more balanced relative to the noncooperative equilibrium. 
 
One caveat concerning our results is that they are focused entirely on “within season” 
competitive balance. We make no apologies for this, since almost all pro-competitive 
balance arguments in the literature have been couched in these terms- i.e. that the 
championship in a given season becomes less interesting the more it is dominated by 
one or  a small number of teams. However, there is an argument to say that “between 
season” balance matters, in the sense that long run domination by the same teams is 
                                                 
30 Imagine bidder 1 values the object at V1 and bidder 2 at V2, with V1 > V2. In an English auction 
bidder 1 wins at a price equal to V2, so bidder 1’s net gain is V1 - V2 and bidder 2’s is zero. Eliminate 
bidder 1 and bidder 2 wins the object and pays 0, giving a net gain of V2 – (V1 - V2) = 2V2 – V1. 
Eliminate bidder 2 and bidder 1 wins at a price of 0 with a net gain of V1 – (V1 - V2) = V2. But clearly 
the elimination of bidder 2 produces the larger net gain, since V2 > 2V2 – V1 => V1 > V2, which is true 
by assumption. This also assumes, of course, that if the low valuation bidder wins he cannot transfer 
the object of the auction to the high valuation bidder.   3
not desirable. In principle, our model suggests that the same teams should dominate 
season after season, since we estimate only a single attendance/wins sensitivity 
parameter for all the seasons that a team appears in our data. However, this is really a 
restriction imposed by the data- given the small number of observations per team it 
would be impractical to estimate time varying parameters. Our theoretical argument is 
simply that attendance is maximised in each season by awarding wins according the 
attendance/wins sensitivity parameters, and that these imply a much less balanced 
competition than we observe in practice. We suspect that attendance could be 
increased still further if changes in the parameters over time were accounted for. 
Moreover, it is worth recording that over time European leagues have been dominated 
by a very small number of teams (Buzzacchi et al (2003) provide striking evidence of 
this), and yet remain hugely popular with fans. At the very least a more sophisticated 
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Appendix: (a) Regression Estimates, team attendance/win sensitivity 
 
  Levels terms    Squared terms   
  Coefficient  Std.Error t-prob  Coefficient  Std.Error t-prob 
Barnsley 28351  2656  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Birmingham City  37751  2775  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Blackburn Rovers  28783  2680  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Bolton Wanderers  31360  2822  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Bournemouth 29820  4020  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Bradford City  32034  2914  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Brighton & Hove Albion  34425  2769  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Bristol City  33361  3173  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Bristol Rovers  22967  3077  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Burnley 31070  2923  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Bury  15711 4647 0.001 -9114 3079 0.003 
Cambridge United  20964  3038  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Cardiff City  25054  3032  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Carlisle United  23558  3559  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Charlton Athletic  26666  2687  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Chelsea 52412  8769  0  -30521  13070  0.02 
Coventry City  33562  4406  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Crewe Alexandra  15765  3500  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Crystal Palace  33854  2658  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Derby County  64093  8375  0  -55921  14550  0 
Fulham 26524  2864  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Gillingham 18298  3720  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Grimsby Town  22795  2693  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Huddersfield Town  31225  2866  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Hull City  27085  3051  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Ipswich  Town  75927  12180 0 -77344  20230 0 
Leeds United  44919  2916  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Leicester City  36476  2788  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Leyton Orient  21386  3214  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Luton Town  26234  2871  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Manchester City  84161  9697  0  -59727  15190  0 
Middlesbrough 37356  2863  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Millwall 24990  2719  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Newcastle United  47882  2865  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Norwich City  35564  2859  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Nottingham Forest  58603  10860  0  -38813  17700  0.029 
Notts County  39272  9085  0  -36051  16970  0.034 
Oldham Athletic  24555  2650  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Oxford United  24180  2935  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Peterborough United  28283  4728  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Plymouth Argyle  31654  3231  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Port Vale  24815  3016  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Portsmouth 32224  2722  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Preston North End  27100  3072  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Queens Park Rangers  30268  2922  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Reading 27964  3095  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Rotherham United  23237  3491  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Sheffield United  51271  8462  0  -38508  15360  0.013 
Sheffield Wednesday  45014  2977  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Shrewsbury Town  22373  2880  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Southend United  21904  3249  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Stockport County  18934  3504  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Stoke City  34180  2718  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Sunderland 47010  2769  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Swansea City  32545  3814  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Swindon Town  28654  2878  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Tranmere Rovers  22842  2875  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Walsall  80356 27050 0.003  -165217  68550 0.016 
Watford 29811  2737  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
West Bromwich Albion  50580  7970  0  -36102  15070  0.017 
West Ham United  43131  3059  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Wimbledon 16459  3139  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
Wolverhampton Wanderers  59370  8767  0  -36580  15160  0.016 
Wrexham 25371  3606  0  -9114  3079  0.003 
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(b) Regression Estimates, year dummies 
 
 
  Coefficient Std.Error t-prob 
YR79  52 739  0.943 
YR80  -52 753  0.945 
YR81  -1988 762  0.009 
YR82  -2806 753  0 
YR83  -3299 759  0 
YR84  -2884 750  0 
YR85  -4658 746  0 
YR86  -5122 748  0 
YR87  -4808 758  0 
YR88  -4106 755  0 
YR89  -3698 751  0 
YR90  -1934 747 0.01 
YR91  -2644 745  0 
YR92  -2566 748  0.001 
YR93  -2980 757  0 
YR94  -2010 746  0.007 
YR95  -2279 742  0.002 
YR96  -1937 745 0.01 
YR97  -1212 744  0.104 
YR98  1163 757  0.125 
YR99  436 745  0.559 
YR00  758 745  0.309 
YR01  1609 738  0.03 
YR02  2079 760  0.006 








   
R
2  0.865 
Adjusted-R
2  0.838 
Heteroscedasticity Test  F(164,332) = 1.0251 (0.4210) 
Normality test 
31  78.710 (0.00) 
 
                                                 
31 We performed tests for heteroskedasticity and normality.  Residual outliers appear for teams such as 
Ipswich Town and Newcastle United. 